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Quieting Cognitive Bias with Standards for
Witness Communications
MELANIE D. WILSON*
Last year, as part of a project to revise the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for
Prosecution and Defense Functions, the ABA Criminal Justice Section initiated
roundtable discussions with prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, and academics
throughout the United States. The Standards under review provide aspirational
guidance for all criminal law practitioners. This Article stems from the Criminal Justice
Section's undertaking. It considers the wording, scope, and propriety of several of the
proposed changes that address lawyer-witness communications. It begins with a
discussion of the effects of cognitive bias on these communications and explains why
carefully tailored Standards may lessen the detrimental impact of those biases. Then,
the Article examines in detail three challenging, yet common aspects of
communications that the Standards seek to influence: (i) communicating with witnesses
about their future communications with opposing counsel, (2) communicating warnings
to witnesses, and (3) communicating with experts. Ultimately, the Article argues for
clarity in the Standards to reduce the impact of unwanted cognitive bias to which we
are all vulnerable.
[1227]
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INTRODUCTION
Just trial outcomes depend on witness accuracy. Favorable and
persuasive testimony is equally essential to a winning verdict. As a result,
all lawyers talk to putative witnesses when preparing for hearings and
trials.' At least in theory, these meetings enhance the witness's ability to
tell her truthful story in a logical way that the jury or judge can follow
and understand. In practice, lawyers fill these meetings with suggestions
about portions of the story the witness should downplay or emphasize,
tips about words the witness should use or avoid, examples of
strategies-such as looking at the jury when answering questions-or
mannerisms the witness should employ, and possible answers to
anticipated cross-examination questions. Portions of these conversations
occur over the phone. Many are held in person, sometimes weeks before
the court proceeding. Depending on a witness's importance, credibility,
and vulnerability, a lawyer may meet with a witness repeatedly to
reassure and to "prepare" her. Some recalcitrant witnesses take coaxing.
All too often, these discussions last only a few minutes and happen on
the day of the court proceeding, when the lawyer, pressed for time, may




exhibit little tact or tolerance, and when her mind may wander,
preoccupied with winning the case. Regardless of the place, timing, or
length of these meetings, lawyers should receive clear guidance about
topics they may, may not, and ought not cover. Such guidance is
warranted because these conversations will either advance or undermine
the witness's truthful testimony.
Several of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecution and
Defense Functions, which are currently undergoing careful study and
revision, are directed at communications between witnesses on the one
hand, and prosecutors or criminal defense lawyers on the other.' This
Article explores some of these Standards and argues, above all else, for
clarity.
Unrelated groups have difficulty understanding each other even in
the best of circumstances. When lawyers talk ambiguously with a witness,
using legally significant terms, the witness may misunderstand the
intended meaning altogether. If the lawyer and witness are from
different cultures or socioeconomic backgrounds, the witness may not
hear the information the lawyer believes she is conveying.' Also, if
lawyers are left to guess about the proper parameters of these
conversations, they will be guided by their own cognitive biases, which
may ultimately impair witness truth-telling. Cognitive bias will tend to
convince lawyers, at least subconsciously, that their "preparation" of a
witness will foster the witness's ability to tell a story effectively rather
than influence the witness to deviate from her own version in ways that
advance the interests of the lawyer's client.! Such implicit and related
biases cause lawyers to view their case, and their own actions and
communications in furtherance of that case, as advancing justice.' Thus,
to the extent that ethics rules and aspirational standards are vague or
silent on a subject, lawyers will tend to construe the ambiguities and fill
the gaps with self-serving interpretations. Moreover, because witness
communications permeate both the investigative and adjudicative phases
of a case, guidance for ethical witness communications should extend to
both.
2. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION (Proposed Revisions 2009);
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCrION (Proposed Revisions 20o). The Author
will, in the course of this Article, draw conclusions about the behavior, thoughts, and actions of
witnesses, victims, and attorneys. These observations derive from her own experience as a prosecutor,
as well as from discussions with other attorneys both in practice and at roundtable discussions.
3. See, e.g., Michelle LeBaron, Cross-Cultural Communication, BEYOND INTRACTABILrry (July
2003), http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/cross-cultural-communication ("[M]iscommunication
is likely to happen, especially when there are significant cultural differences between communicators.").
4. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2ooo); see also infra Part I.
5. Id. at lo85-87.
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The need for firm and sure guidance in the Standards is exemplified
by several cases that recently surfaced in which trial outcomes seemingly
rested on testimony tainted by pretrial communications. In some of these
cases, the questionable testimony was the product of a prosecutor's direct
influence. In others, government investigators engaged in misconduct to
strengthen the government's case. In one, defendant Mark Sodersten was
convicted of "beating, sexually assaulting and slicing the throat of a 26-
year-old mother of two young children" based on eye-witness testimony
from "the victim's 3-year-old daughter and one of the victim's
neighbors."6 However, two audio recordings, discovered long after the
conviction became final, revealed that during detectives' interviews of
the victim's neighbor, the neighbor said that he "made up the entire story
about seeing Sodersten attack the victim, and that [he had been] on PCP
the night of the attack and couldn't remember anything that happened."'
The two recordings were never produced to the defense. In another
case, the district attorney in Burleson County, Texas declared in October
2010 the innocence of Anthony Graves, who had been convicted of
murdering six people and sentenced to death row by the previous district
attorney.' The new district attorney suggested that the previous
prosecutor convicted Graves using witnesses who were pressured into
providing testimony favorable to the government.'o According to a
newspaper account, the new district attorney "accused the former district
attorney of hiding evidence and threatening witnesses," including
threatening to prosecute the wife of a key cooperating witness, if the
witness did not testify that Graves helped the witness commit the
murders."
6. See Mark Curriden, Harmless Error? A New Study Claims Prosecutorial Misconduct Is
Rampant in California, A.B.A. J., Dec. 20o0, at 18, i8-i9 (discussing a study by the Northern
California Innocence Project at Santa Clara University School of Law that evaluated the prevalence of
prosecutorial misconduct in California and concluded that "prosecutorial misconduct in the nation's
most populous state continues to be a problem, and that prosecutors are seldom held accountable for
[that] misconduct").
7. Id.
8. Id. Notably, the failure to produce the tapes was not the fault of the prosecutor, who did not
know about them. Id.
9. See Leonard Pitts, Editorial, An Innocent Man, BUFFALONEWS.COM (Nov. 6, 2010),
http://www.buffalonews.com/editorial-page/columns/national-views/article243765.ece (explaining how
the new district attorney criticized the prior district attorney for prosecuting Graves although "not a
single thing ... says Anthony Graves was involved").
io. See id.; Jordan Smith, Anthony Graves Case Raises the Dead ... Again, CHRON.COM (June 13,
2oo8), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7266988.html (explaining how the district
attorney failed to provide the defendant with an exculpatory recantation of the primary witness and allowed
the witness to give perjured testimony on the witness stand); see also Story of an Injustice: Anthony Graves,
AwrHONYGRAVES.ORG, http://www.anthonygraves.org/documents/ANTHONYGRAVESCASE.pdf (last
visited May 23, 2011).
iI. Brian Rogers, Team Overturning Graves Case Blasts Ex-DA, CHRON.COM (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7266988.html. Defense lawyers, too, have allegedly
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Judges also have publicly expressed exasperation with the way some
prosecutors have manipulated witnesses during pretrial communications.
For instance, Judge Cormac Carney asserted that prosecutors in the case
against the cofounders of Broadcom Corporation "intimidated and
improperly influenced" each of the defendants' three witnesses.I2 One
prosecutor allegedly threatened a defense witness with perjury charges
"if he testified the same way he had during an SEC deposition."" And,
there is the highly publicized case of former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens
in which prosecutors admitted to failing to produce key evidence to the
defense or the court, including notes from the government's interview
with its star witness, a construction contractor. 4 The notes would have
revealed that the witness's trial testimony was inaccurate."
Clear instructions defining appropriate and inappropriate witness
communications are likely to reduce instances of attorney wrongdoing, at
least when lawyer misconduct is inadvertent or the result of difficult
judgment calls. Definitive guidance will also make it easier to justify
discipline for unscrupulous lawyers who engage in improper
communications, as their claims of mistake or ignorance will prove less
convincing.
While all lawyers occasionally face questions about the proper limits
of their communications with witnesses, prosecutors and criminal
defense attorneys confront these issues frequently because of the trial-
tried to influence witnesses to give false testimony to help a client's cause. See Mark Fass, New York
Defense Attorney's Trial Begins in Witness Tampering Case, N.Y. L.J. (July 28, 2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=12o2432578327&slretum=i&hbxlogin=i (reporting on the trial
of a well-known New York defense lawyer who allegedly bribed a witness to give testimony favorable
to his drug kingpin client); see also Cameron Probert, Witness Tampering Trial Begins for Quincy
Attorney, COLUMBIA BASIN HERALD (May 28, 2009, 12:oo AM), http://www.columbiabasinherald.com/
news/local-business/article_5bcdag71-3174-55o3-9b54-7a6o4bfb996c.htm (explaining the prosecution's
case depended heavily on one witness, whom the prosecution had subpoenaed, so defense counsel had
told the witness to leave town to avoid testifying against the defendant, which the witness did).
12. Anna Stolley Persky, Aggressive Justice, A.B.A. J., May 201o, at 36,37.
13. Stuart Pfeifer, Testimony Ends in Trial of Broadcom Ex-CFO, L.A. TIMES, Dec. II, 2009, at
B2.
14. Nedra Pickler & Matt Apuzzo, Judge Opens Case Against Ted Stevens Prosecutors,
HUFFINGTON PosT (Apr. 7, 2009, 7:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.coM/2oo9/o4/07/judge-opens-
case-against-n-184o9o.html; Jason Ryan, Key Evidence in Stevens Case Tossed out, ABC NEWS (Oct.
9, 2008), http://abcnews.go.comfTheLawlFedCrimes/Story?id=598 9 214&page=I; see also United States
v. Golding, 168 F-3 d 700, 701-02 (4th Cir. 1999) (vacating and remanding the defendant's conviction
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because of prosecutor's misconduct in threatening to
prosecute the defendant's wife for possession of marijuana if the wife testified for the defense at trial
concerning ownership of the gun); United States v. Scheer, 168 F.3d 445, 449-51 (izth Cir. 1999)
(reversing because the prosecutor threatened his own witness and the government failed to disclose
this threat to the defense); United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, ix88 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing and
remanding because the prosecutor threatened to prosecute the defendant's wife for perjury and to
withdraw her plea agreement in another case in order to convince the wife not to testify as the
defendant's alibi).
15. See Pickler & Apuzzo, supra note 14; Ryan, supra note 14.
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laden nature of their work. The proposed ABA Criminal Justice
Standards for Prosecution and Defense Functions attempt to direct these
recurrent communications, giving aspirational guidance beyond that
already found in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Relying, in part, on roundtable discussions with judges, academics,
prosecutors, and defense counsel in Florida, Rhode Island, and Ohio,
this Article considers whether the proposals strike the right balance. In
the process of examining the wording, reach, and limits of several of the
proposed Standards, this Article stresses the advantages of explicit
direction." Such guidance will reduce the harmful influence of cognitive
and social bias on lawyers' rational decisionmaking" and help identify
prosecutors and defense lawyers who are practicing below the ethical
baseline.
Understanding that clear guidance is important, the Standards could
be implemented using various approaches. At one extreme, prosecutors
and defense lawyers could be told to refrain from "advising"
unrepresented victims and third parties." In support of such a bright-line
rule, the Standards might declare that lawyers may impart "information"
about the judicial process, including when and where the witness will
testify and the manner in which cross-examination is likely to occur, but
dissuade lawyers from recommending any particular course of action,
such as possible responses to direct or cross-examination questions. Of
course, drawing a useful line between advice and information would
prove difficult, at best, and potentially meaningless if the ambiguous
terms were not defined adequately. A second possibility would be to
6. These roundtable discussions were sponsored and coordinated by the ABA Criminal Justice
Section and held at various law schools across the United States.
17. In this Article, the words "proposed Standards" refer to the pending draft revisions of the
Criminal Defense and Prosecution Function Standards, whereas the words "current Standards" reflect
the Standards in place before the revision project. The proposed Prosecution Function Standards are
printed in full in Rory K. Little, Introduction: The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice
Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGs L.J. iiii, app. (2011). The
proposed Defense Function Standards are printed in full in Rory K. Little, The Role of Reporter to a
Law Project, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 747, app. (2011).
is. See discussion infra Part I; see also Alafair Burke, Commentary, Brady's Brainteaser: The
Accidental Prosecutor and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 575, 576-78 (2007) [hereinafter
Burke, Brainteaser] (discussing confirmation bias and selective information processing); Alafair S.
Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1587, 1590-91 (2oo6) [hereinafter Burke, Improving] (arguing that prosecutors are irrational
humans and noting cognitive research demonstrating that humans systematically hold a set of
cognitive biases); Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOzo L. REV. 2119, 2133-34
(2010) [hereinafter Burke, Talking].
19. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 4.3 (2010) ("The lawyer shall not give legal advice
to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the interests of such person are . . . in conflict with the interests of the client."); Wis.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT SCR 20:3.8 (d)(i) (2010) ("When communicating with an unrepresented
person a prosecutor may discuss the matter... but a prosecutor, other than a municipal prosecutor,
shall not: (I) otherwise provide legal advice to the person.. .. ").
[Vol. 62:I227I232
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allow prosecutors and defense lawyers to convey "information" to
witnesses, but only for certain well-defined topics. Other subject matter
areas would be prohibited. Under this system, lawyers might be
permitted to discuss the process of cross-examination but prohibited
from suggesting answers to potential questions. This second approach
might provide more certain guidance but would require an unwieldy and
lengthy list of topics that would inevitably prove insufficient. No doubt, a
list would fail to anticipate all of the situations that prosecutors and
defense lawyers eventually face. The proposed Standards opt for a
middle approach, offering certain dos and don'ts while also providing
general guidance covering a wide range of situations.
Before turning to the specifics of the proposed Standards, Part I of
this Article underscores a few of the effects of cognitive bias on lawyers'
communications with witnesses and explains why carefully tailored
standards may lessen the detrimental impact of such biases.
Understanding that the topic of communicating with witnesses is wide
ranging and that several of the proposed Standards cover the subject
matter, Part II narrows the focus, examining three challenging, yet
common, aspects: (I) talking to witnesses about their future
communications with opposing counsel, (2) communicating warnings to
witnesses, and (3) communicating with experts. These three areas of
witness contact are among the most important covered by the proposed
Standards. Moreover, the Standards addressed to these areas are among
those that call for the most guesswork.
I. SUPPORT FOR ASPIRATIONAL STANDARDS GUIDING
LAWYER-WITNESS COMMUNICATIONS
"Research in the behavioral sciences has demonstrated that
individuals are systematically biased in their predictions of the probable
results of various events."2 In other words, actors' "self-serving" bias
causes them to "interpret information in ways that serve their interests or
preconceived notions."" For prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers,
most of whom spend considerable time preparing witnesses to testify at
hearings and trials, these natural human biases may lead them to grow
myopic about the facts of a case or the credibility of the witnesses telling
the trial story. Lawyers may hear what they hope and expect to hear:
facts that support rather than undermine their client's interests. When
these ordinary biases combine with trial lawyers' instinctive affinity for
winning cases, there are robust reasons for lawyers to influence
2o. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1085.
21. Id. at lo93; see also Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM.
ECON. REv. 1337, 1337-38 (995) ("There is considerable evidence from the psychology literature of a
self-serving bias in judgments of fairness."); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of
Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 140 (1993).
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witnesses' testimony in subtle or obvious ways, and additional reasons
for the lawyers to attempt to isolate witnesses from the influence of
opposing counsel, who may attempt to sway the witnesses' story in an
opposite manner. Similarly, having become convinced that her side
represents "right," "fairness," or "just desserts," advocates who
aggressively and zealously seek to advance their side will tend to resist
ethically desirable protections for witnesses. As discussed in Part II, this
resistance may result in lawyers' reluctance to warn witnesses against
self-incrimination or to shrink from admonishing witnesses about
inadvertent waivers of privileged communications with spouses, lawyers,
and psychiatrists. It also may undermine integrity-promoting courses of
action such as sharing material and favorable evidence with defense
counsel.
The dominant theory on cognitive bias suggests that "implicit
attitudinal biases are especially important in influencing nondeliberate or
spontaneous discriminatory behaviors."" For example, "anchoring" bias
causes actors to tend to assess situations with preconceived notions and
to fail to reassess the situation as new information develops.23 Biases,
such as these, "are not readily capable of being unlearned. Instead, they
affect us all with uncanny consistency and unflappable persistence."24
Thus, to the extent prosecutors and defense lawyers are communicating
with witnesses without definitive guidance to cabin their "nondeliberate"
and "spontaneous" decisions about what and how to communicate, these
lawyers are likely to evaluate the witnesses' stories, other corroborating
or refuting evidence, and other aspects of a case with their own implicit
attitudinal biases. In many instances, these biases will lead these
advocates to overestimate the credibility of a witness, discount the
reliability of opposing evidence, and undeservedly doubt the motives of
the opposing party or opposing counsel. As a result, prosecutors may
take unnecessarily protective postures regarding victims, deciding for
example that they should be warned against sharing information with
defense counsel. Defense lawyers may be tempted to permit a confused
witness to continue to believe that she is talking to a government
representative. Both the prosecution and defense may be attracted to
"expert" witnesses who are known to favor one party over the other."
22. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 961 (2oo6).
23. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63o, 64o-72 (i999) (presenting a brief overview of behavioral
research and literature).
24. Id. at 633 (footnote omitted).
25. There are hired-gun "expert" witnesses notorious for testifying only for the prosecution or
always for the defense. See, e.g., Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 14q F-3d 23, 27 (ist Cir.
1998) (noting that the defendant's expert witness in a civil case had testified thirty-six times for the
defendant, representing eighty percent of his expert testimony); Chauppette v. Northland Ins. Co., No.
[Vol. 62:12271234
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These tendencies are predictable in an adversarial system designed to
favor the rival who presents the most compelling evidence and the most
persuasive testimony in a one-time, all-or-nothing trial. Although
understandable in a competitive litigation system, none of these practices
encourages witness accuracy or promotes confidence that the system is
equitable. Thus, to the extent the ABA Criminal Justice Section crafts
and adopts standards that result in a check on cognitive biases-which
are generally exacerbated by every trial lawyer's desire to win a case-
the project is a worthwhile and compelling endeavor.
Although cognitive biases can prove stubborn to combat, behavioral
research indicates that clear guidance can promote desired behaviors or,
for purposes of this Article, ethical and principled witness
communications. This research suggests that behavior can be altered by
shaping social norms, provided the community subjected to such norms is
"generally prone to respect the law."' Whatever else might be said about
lawyers, as a whole we are a community that respects the law. We study
it. We "brief" it in excruciating detail. We draft it and lobby for its
passage. We hide behind it when it benefits us. We distinguish it when
our situation falls slightly outside of its established strictures. In short, if
researchers are correct that a community that respects the law is subject
to influence from social norms, then the Prosecution and Defense
Function Standards will impact lawyer behavior by providing such
norms. The Standards will remove the need for lawyers to decide on a
case-by-case, witness-by-witness basis what ethical communication
demands. The key, of course, is to adopt standards that are sufficiently
certain and authoritative so that prosecutors and defense lawyers
understand and defer to them."
Having discussed in Part I the advantages of definitive standards in
reducing undesirable cognitive bias, the next Part examines three
08-4193, 2009 WL 4060452 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 2009) (citing cases in which courts required discovery
disclosure on a percentage of expert's testimony for one party and total income from giving expert
testimony, because the information was indicative of bias); Behler v. Hanlon, 199 F.R.D. 553 (D. Md.
2ool) (recognizing probative value on the issue of bias of the defense expert's history of testifying for
the defendant and for insurance companies defending personal injury suits).
26. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1131-32 ("The primary deterrent effect many laws have on
undesirable behavior might not be the direct increase in the price of the behavior through the threat of
fines, civil liability, or jail sentences, but the encouragement of a social norm against the activity."); see
also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 22, at 963 (noting that some studies have shown that "implicit
biases are malleable").
27. For a discussion on the degree of specificity the Standards should take, see Ellen S. Podgor,
The Role of the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards: Stagnant or Progressive?, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 1159 (2011). Also as part of these roundtable discussions, Professor Andrew Taslitz discussed
cognitive biases in prosecution. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Incautious Media, Free Speech, and the
Unfair Trial: Why Prosecutors Need More Realistic Guidance in Dealing with the Press, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 1285, 1290-93 (201).
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common aspects of lawyer-witness communications that the proposed
Standards seek to influence.
11. THREE CHALLENGING, YET COMMON, ASPECTS OF LAWYER-WITNESS
COMMUNICATIONS THAT THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
STANDARDS SEEK TO SHAPE
At some point, every lawyer who works as a prosecutor or criminal
defense lawyer will: (I) desire to insulate a vulnerable witness from
manipulation by opposing counsel, (2) wonder whether she should
caution an unrepresented witness against volunteering self-incriminating
information or offering evidence protected by some other legal
protection, such as privilege, or (3) seek to select and prepare an expert
witness in a manner that ensures testimony favorable to a client's cause.
Below, and in turn, this Part considers the guidance the proposed
Standards offer for these and related issues.
A. TALKING TO WITNESSES ABOUT THEIR FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS WITH
OPPOSING COUNSEL
Because ours is an adversarial and competitive justice system, in
which one side benefits from the opposing party's lack of preparation or
information, prosecutors and defense counsel may be predisposed
consciously or subconsciously to discourage witnesses from talking to
opposing counsel." Prosecutors often feel particularly protective of
victims and may experience a strong inclination to dissuade them from
giving interviews to anyone outside of the government, especially in
cases of violent crime and fraud in which victims are readily identifiable
and may be at risk for further victimization or intimidation." Regardless
of which side the lawyer represents, the type of case, or the number of
victims, from a competitor's perspective, there is no advantage when a
witness shares information with opposing counsel. Exposure to opposing
counsel may reveal a witness's loss of memory, confusion, fear of
testifying, or a lack of confidence in her ability to testify persuasively. A
witness might unwittingly bring to light a party's strategy or the
weaknesses a lawyer perceives in the evidence. Moreover, when a
witness talks with opposing counsel, she necessarily becomes susceptible
to potential impeachment later. Because the prosecution bears the
burden of proof, and often is the first to interview fragile victims, the
temptation to "protect" evidence and victims from exposure to an
28.. At some point, such "discouragement" would violate Model Rules of Professional Conduct
3.4(a) and 3.4(f). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.4(a) (2010) ("A lawyer should
not ... obstruct another party's access to evidence.); id. R. 3.4(f) ("A lawyer should not request a
person ... to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party . . . .").
29. This conclusion derives.from my own experience as a former prosecutor and from views
expressed by prosecutors in the roundtable discussions I attended for this project.
I1236 [Vol. 62.I 1227
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adversary may be particularly acute for prosecutors. Furthermore, in
each geographic region I visited for this project,3" prosecutors indicated
that witnesses contacted by the defense routinely report confusion about
the identity and affiliation of defense counsel or defense counsel's
investigator.3 Witnesses regularly believe that they are talking to the
government when they are, in fact, speaking with the defense."
i. The Prosecution Function Standards
Conflation of the prosecution and defense is reportedly common,
even when the defense takes precautionary steps-such as giving each
witness an identifying business card -to avoid these misunderstandings."
These mix-ups can lead witnesses to feel tricked and mistreated by the
justice system. Witnesses are typically chance participants in the criminal
process. They either saw or heard something of relevance, or they were
victimized by someone. As a result, and not uncommonly, they take part
reluctantly and with little understanding of the intricacies of the process.
If fully informed about how the system operates, some witnesses might
choose to talk only to the prosecution. Should prosecutors have
discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to tell a victim or
witness that she should remain wary of all communication with defense
counsel? Proposed Standards 3-4.1 and 3-3.5 provide limited guidance on
this subject.34
Perhaps because these issues are open to significant debate, the
proposed Standards recommend a significant modification to the current
Standards. Proposed Standard 3-4.1 eschews the language in current
Standard 3-3.1 -a self contained and express provision on the topic of
witness communications with defense counsel35 -and, instead, points
prosecutors to the recently adopted ABA Criminal Justice Standards for
Prosecutorial Investigations ("Investigation Standards")." Current
30. As part of the ABA Criminal Justice Section project on the ABA proposed Standards, I
visited Tampa, Florida; Bristol, Rhode Island; and Cleveland, Ohio. In each location, participants
discussed various proposed Standards, including many of those I present in this Article.
31. The ABA Model Rules speak to every lawyer's duty to reduce obvious witness confusion on
this point. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 4.3 (200) ("When the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter,
the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding."). A duty to reduce obvious
confusion does not mean that confusion is uncommon or that the defense is intentionally creating it.
32. Defense counsel present at the roundtable discussions shared prosecutors' concern about
witness confusion. One defense lawyer in Ohio explained that he always gives his business card to
witnesses as concrete and tangible proof, if needed later, that he did not misrepresent his identity.
33. See supra notes 29 & 32.
34. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION H 3-3.5, 3-4.1 (Proposed Revisions
2010).
35. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3 -3.i(d) (3 d ed. 1993).
36. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCrION § 3-4.1 (Proposed Revisions 2olo).
The Investigation Standards were adopted in 2oo8. See generally STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS (2o08).
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Standard 3-3.1 expressly prohibits prosecutors from discouraging
witnesses from talking with the defense. It provides: "A prosecutor
should not discourage or obstruct communication between prospective
witnesses and defense counsel. A prosecutor should not advise any
person or cause any person to be advised to decline to give to the defense
information which such person has the right to give."3
In contrast, the proposed Standards replace this language with the
following cross-reference to the Investigation Standards: "When
performing an investigative function, prosecutors should be familiar with
and follow the ABA Standards on Prosecutorial Investigations." 8 In
turn, Investigation Standard 1-4(d) says:
Absent a law or court order to the contrary, the prosecutor should
not imply or state that it is unlawful for potential witnesses to disclose
information related to or discovered during an investigation. The
prosecutor may ask potential witnesses not to disclose information, and
in doing so, the prosecutor may explain to them the adverse
consequences that might result from disclosure (such as compromising
the investigation or endangering others)."
As an initial matter, the reference to the Investigation Standards is
curious because the preamble to those Standards recognizes directly that
"[a] prosecutor's investigative role, responsibilities and potential liability
are different from the prosecutor's role and responsibilities as a
courtroom advocate."4 o Indeed, prosecutors sometimes meet with
witnesses and victims when determining whether and what crime to
charge, but more often, they talk with witnesses to prepare them to
testify at hearings and during trials.41 Thus, to the extent any regulation
of communications is warranted, guidance should be available for both
contexts. Moreover, providing a separate Standard for the adjudicative
context recognizes the prosecutor's differing roles in these related, but
different, environments.' Because prosecutors are at least as likely to
deal with witnesses in the adjudicative context as they are when
investigating crimes, the topic deserves its own express discussion in the
Prosecution Function Standards. In the roundtable discussion sessions,
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel agreed.43
37. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.i(d) (3 d ed. 1993).
38. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.1 (Proposed Revisions 2010).
39. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § I.4(d) (2oo8).
40. Id. at pmbl.
41. This was certainly my experience as a prosecutor and my observation about other prosecutors
around me.
42. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 861-62 (2oo9) (holding that absolute immunity
extends to prosecutors when acting as officers of the court and pursuing adjudicative prosecution
functions but not when engaged in investigative or administrative tasks).
43. See supra notes 16 & 30.
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More substantively, the Investigation Standards fail to address one
of the most controversial topics on the subject of communicating with
witnesses: whether a prosecutor may tell a witness of the many potential
pitfalls of talking to the accused's lawyer, under what circumstances, and
when the prosecutor's warning has gone too far. Although Investigation
Standard I.4(d) allows the prosecutor to warn a witness about the risks
of disclosing information generally, it says nothing about the witness's
communications with defense lawyers." Arguably, the silence in the
Investigation Standard indicates the ABA's approval of such tactics.
Normally, silence might suggest a lack of contemplation of the subject,
but when viewed in light of current Standard 3-3.1, which expressly
informs prosecutors not to "discourage or obstruct communication
between prospective witnesses and defense counsel,"45 the removal of the
language implies approval. Whether the Standard approves or
disapproves of this type of advice, it should be made clear. Otherwise, it
leaves prosecutors to guess about this important and persistent matter.
Assuming that the Standard should address this issue, what
guidance is appropriate? A Standard could be devised to allow
prosecutors to guard witnesses against confusion over lawyer affiliation
and other communications that might leave witnesses feeling misguided.
However, if such a Standard were implemented and prosecutors were
allowed to caution witnesses about talking with the defense, further
guidelines would be needed to outline how "discouraging" prosecutors
could be. An early draft of the proposed Standards permitted a
prosecutor to warn a witness that sharing information could result in
adverse consequences to the prosecution's case or to other witnesses; it
also spoke more directly about talking to defense counsel:
A prosecutor should not tell, or encourage others to tell, witnesses
that they may not communicate with defense counsel. A prosecutor
may, however, ask potential witnesses not to disclose information, and
may explain to witnesses the possible adverse consequences that might
result from disclosure (such as compromising the investigation or
endangering others).
Thus, the earlier proposal was akin to the Investigation Standard. It
provided that prosecutors should not tell witnesses that they are
prohibited from talking with the defense, but it left room for prosecutors
to discourage a victim or any other witness from engaging in those
communications.47 Assuming that it is desirable for a prosecutor to be
44. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § 14(d) (2oo8).
45. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.t(d) (3d ed. 1993).
46. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3 -4.i(d) (Proposed Revisions
2009). In every meeting of the roundtable discussions, the groups preferred current Standard 3-3.i(d)




given discretion to deter some victims and other witnesses from talking
to the defense (and I believe that it is), the prosecutor's discretion should
be restricted in a finite way. For instance, the Standard might allow
prosecutors to caution witnesses about talking to the defense only when
prosecutors have reason to believe that the victim or case will be harmed
if the witness shares information with the defense, or when they believe
that a witness may mistake the defense for the government.
As is, the proposed Standard seems to permit extensive cautioning
about defense counsel, without indicating when such cautioning goes too
far. It allows a prosecutor to tell a crime victim or other witness that a
representative of the defense may try to contact the victim and that the
victim has no obligation to talk to the representative.4" It does not forbid
the prosecutor from cautioning the victim to remain skeptical of the
defense because the defendant's lawyer may be quick to undermine the
victim's interests and may try to trick the victim into saying something
that she will later regret. The proposed Standard does not prohibit the
prosecutor from suggesting that if the victim or witness talks to the
defense, the defense may later try to embarrass the witness or to twist
her words. It also seems to sanction other communications in which the
prosecutor tells the victim that she should feel free to hang up on the
defense lawyer or to refuse to answer the door in order to avoid
interaction with the defense.49 As written, the proposed Standard would
not prohibit a prosecutor from sharing anecdotes with a witness about
negative experiences with this particular defense lawyer, such as
explaining how the lawyer embarrassed a victim or witness in court after
the witness naively and innocently talked to the lawyer informally before
the proceeding. Indeed, under the proposal, a prosecutor would be free
to muse out loud with a witness about a worst-case scenario in which the
defendant's lawyer surreptitiously records the witness's statement and
later, in court, uses the recording in an attempt to discredit and
embarrass the witness. Especially in light of Model Rule 3.4(a),
prohibiting a lawyer from obstructing another party's access to
evidence,"o it is doubtful that the proposed Standard is accomplishing its
goal of allowing prosecutors to protect the neediest of victims and
witnesses from abuse without unduly obstructing defense counsel from
uncovering relevant facts and information. In fact, as drafted, the
proposed Standard seems to be in tension with Model Rule 3.4(a).
Even if the proposed Standard is intended to permit a prosecutor to
share this type of cautionary information -presuming the information is
true, of course-should the Standard apply equally to victim and
48. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.i(d) (Proposed Revisions
2010).
49. Id.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2010).
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nonvictim witnesses? In many instances, the prosecution contacts -and
therefore potentially influences -nonvictim witnesses long before the
defense knows their identities. Because neither the proposed Standard
nor the Investigation Standards differentiates between victim and
nonvictim witnesses, prosecutors will be left to decide these issues from
the perspective of an adversary who is usually convinced that the
defendant is guilty and that justice demands conviction and,
correspondingly, protection of the case, the witnesses, and, in particular,
the victims. Without doubt, these inherent pro-prosecution biases will
lead prosecutors to warn witnesses to avoid unnecessary contact with the
defense. If the drafters of the Standard intend to foster more
communication between witnesses and the defense, the proposed
Standard should be modified to reflect that goal. If the Standard is
intended to permit prosecutors to exercise extensive discretion, then it
should say so expressly. There are meritorious arguments for either
policy decision. Certainly, with clear boundaries in the Standard,
prosecutors could be expected to inform witnesses about the system and
their role in it, allowing witnesses to understand the importance of taking
interviews seriously, and speaking honestly and carefully whenever they
talk with counsel for either side. However, without taking a specific
position on this issue, the Standard leaves prosecutors to guess about the
best course of action, resulting, at a minimum, in inconsistent treatment
of witnesses and in unpredictability for defendants regarding how much
access they will have to witnesses.
Proposed Standard 3-3.5, which addresses a prosecutor's
"relationship" with victims and witnesses, also implies that a prosecutor
holds extensive discretion to insulate a victim or witness from defense
counsel or from anyone else, if the witness "may need" such protection."
On this point, proposed Standard 3 -3 .5(k) says: "The prosecutor should
seek to ensure that victims and witnesses who may need protection
against intimidation or retaliation are advised of and afforded
protections where feasible."" The words "intimidation" and "retaliation"
are left undefined. Thus, a prosecutor could reasonably interpret
"intimidation" to include probing pretrial interviews by defense counsel
or could give the word some other expansive interpretation. Likewise,
prosecutors may interpret "retaliation" very broadly.
Because victims, by definition, have been exploited by someone
whom they believe to be the defendant, they regularly ask prosecutors
how to protect themselves from further victimization. Victims often
perceive the prosecutor as their champion. Especially when a case is





complex or a victim particularly vulnerable and integral to the
prosecution, a prosecutor can spend significant time meeting with the
victim and preparing her to testify. From the victim's perspective, such
repeated interaction suggests that the prosecutor represents the victim
and shares the victim's interests. Of course, as the Investigation
Standards make express, the prosecutor represents "the public," not
individuals.53 Nevertheless, because victims look to prosecutors for
guidance, they commonly express fear of a defendant and convey a
desire to avoid any nonessential interaction with either the defendant or
her lawyer.54
Because the proposed Standard leaves prosecutors unilaterally to
interpret the words "intimidation" and "retaliation," it gives prosecutors
leeway to take an excessively protective posture and thereby discourage
important witness-defense communications in many routine cases. For
example, the prosecutor might decide that a majority of witnesses are
sensitive and, therefore, subject to undue influence from opposing
counsel. What is to prevent her from telling all of these witnesses: "It is
unwise to talk to defense counsel or anyone who represents the interests
of the defendant. Anything you tell the defense may reach the defendant,
even your address, phone number, or other personal and identifying
information. You could jeopardize the case and your personal safety."
Another prosecutor might similarly tell witnesses: "You have the right to
talk to defense counsel. Just understand, if you want to stay safe and
assure that the defendant is convicted, your best strategy is to avoid all
contact with the defendant, her lawyer, her lawyer's investigator, and the
defendant's family and friends." If prosecutors can and do speak in these
terms, the defense will enjoy significantly less access to witnesses.
Such admonitions are, no doubt, warranted in a few unusual cases,
for example, those with extremely dangerous defendants who have a
history of threatening witnesses, but there is no reason for similar
cautions in run-of-the-mill cases. When a witness shows no indication of
vulnerability to intimidation and a defendant shows no inclination to
intimidate or threaten witnesses, a prosecutor should permit the defense
access. One ethics opinion from Colorado goes further and suggests that
prosecutors should encourage witness-defense communications, explaining
that prosecutors should tell witnesses that while they are under no
obligation to do so, the interests of justice favor making themselves
available to the defense." While the Colorado opinion arguably goes too
53. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS § I.2(b) (2oo8); see also
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FuNcTrION § 3-1.2(b) (Proposed Revisions 2010) ("The
prosecutor's client is the public... not particular government agencies, witnesses, or victims.").
54. This observation also rests on my own observations when I was prosecuting cases.
55. Ethics Comm. of Colo. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 65 (1984). In an essay exploring the tension
"between the growing public concern for victims' rights and traditional concerns for the rights of an
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far the other way, the Standards should confine prosecutors' discretion
by defining "intimidation" and "retaliation" so that such warnings to
witnesses hinge on some evidence that the defendant will try to
discourage a witness from testifying or to alter the substance of the
witness's truthful testimony.
As discussed briefly in Part I, cognitive biases, which tend to make
us protective of those within our inner circle and to predispose us to
ideas we form early in our decisionmaking process, will tend to lead all
prosecutors to urge witnesses not to share information with the defense,
especially given that prosecutors are also zealous advocates seeking to
"win" a conviction. Therefore, if the Standards intend to give defense
counsel equal or similar access to witnesses, then the proposed Standards
should provide more restrictive direction about how an ethical and
professional prosecutor responds to these dilemmas. Prosecutors need
express guidance regarding when they may caution witnesses about
talking to the defense, whether they must treat nonvictim witnesses
differently than they treat victims, and what restraint, if any, they must
observe when protecting vulnerable witnesses from intimidation. Such
guidance will necessarily reduce the influence of bias that affects
discretionary decisions and may prevent those prosecutors who engage in
intentional prosecutorial misconduct from successfully claiming
ignorance or a good-faith mistake.
Presuming that the Standards can be crafted to effectively guide
prosecutors, should defense counsel share similar duties when
communicating with nondefendant witnesses? After all, the defense acts
in conjunction with her own set of cognitive and social biases; yet, the
defense fills a role quite distinct from that of the prosecutor.
2. The Defense Function Standard
The proposal for the Defense Function Standards on the subject of
talking with witnesses about opposing counsel is still undergoing
significant study and revision by the ABA Criminal Justice Section. It,
nevertheless, differs substantially from the proposed Prosecution
Function Standards. Proposed Standard 4-4.4(e) currently reads:
"Defense counsel should not discourage or obstruct communication
between prospective witnesses and the prosecutor."" In other words, the
accused," David Caudill cites this ethics opinion, which informs prosecutors that if asked whether a
witness should submit to an interview by defense counsel, prosecutors should inform the witness that
"it is in the interest of justice that the witness be available for interview by counsel." David S. Caudill,
Professional Deregulation of Prosecutors: Defense Contact with Victims, Survivors, and Witnesses in the
Era of Victims' Rights, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 103, 103, 115 (2oo3) (emphasis omitted).
56. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCION § 4-4.4(e) (Proposed Revisions 2009).
The proposed Standard makes an exception for communication between defense counsel and the
defendant. "Defense counsel should not advise any person other than a client, or cause such person to
be advised, to decline to give to the prosecutor or defense counsel for codefendants information which
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proposal for the defense is the equivalent of current Standard 3-3.i(d)
for prosecutors. As discussed above, unlike current Standard 3-3.1(d),
the proposed Prosecution Function Standard permits prosecutors to
discourage some witnesses from talking to the defense."
The proposed Defense Function Standard tacitly recognizes that
prosecutors and defense lawyers play different roles in the criminal
justice process and that different standards and expectations are,
therefore, appropriate. The prosecutor's objective should be justice;
defense counsel's goal is freedom for the accused. A prosecutor's role as
"minister of justice" demands that she seek an accurate result regardless
of who wins the case and that she protect victims from additional harm."
Perhaps, due to their unique role, prosecutors are expected to be more
inclined than the defense to gather information from witnesses without
trying to gain an advantage in the case and to recognize when justice
demands that the defense have access to witnesses." The defense's role
of zealous advocacy never demands even-handed presentations of fact
and imposes no special obligation to witnesses. Because defense counsel
is duty bound to the defendant, even at the cost of embarrassing or
pressuring some witnesses, many defense lawyers affect witness
testimony differently than prosecutors do. While the defense seeks to
unearth any fact that may exonerate the defendant or help to reduce her
sentence, the prosecution-at least in theory-wants to ensure that a
witness is credible and that the system protects the witness's ability to tell
her truthful story. Because their responsibilities are different, there are
persuasive reasons to allow prosecutors to exercise some discretion and
to advise some vulnerable witnesses about whether or not to talk with
the defense, but to prohibit defense lawyers from discouraging
conversations with the prosecution.
Many defense lawyers may, nevertheless, object to uneven
treatment in the Standards, especially on the subject of lawyer
communications with nonvictim witnesses. Defense lawyers, just like
prosecutors, are officers of the court, owing the court a duty of candor."
Each is an advocate, duty bound by all of the respective ethical rules in
such person has a right to give." Id. (emphasis added). The proposal is virtually identical to the current
Prosecution Function Standard, which has been revised substantially in the proposed amendments.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.i(d) (3d ed. 1993).
57. See supra Part II.A.I.
58. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1362 (2on1) (explaining that prosecutors have
a special "duty to seek justice, not merely convict"); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)
(stating that prosecutors owe a duty of justice).
59. This was generally my own observation as a prosecutor. Admittedly, my faith in most
prosecutors and skepticism for some defense lawyers may be explained by "ingroup bias," which
"designates favoritism toward groups to which one belongs" and necessarily implies a relative
negativity toward a complementary out group. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 22, at 951-52.
6o. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (200) (requiring candor to the tribunal).
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her jurisdiction. With the imposition of different standards, the
prosecution gains at least some competitive advantage over ethical and
professional defense counsel. Furthermore, one can imagine
circumstances in which defense counsel would advance justice by
discouraging a witness from talking openly with the prosecution or to a
codefendant's lawyer. For instance, the defense may learn that a hard-to-
find eyewitness can offer favorable testimony for the defendant but is
scared to come forward because of possible immigration consequences or
potential retaliation. Under such limited circumstances, where the
witness is needed for an accurate trial outcome, one that might exonerate
the defendant, perhaps the defense should have a limited right to
discourage these witnesses from volunteering information to opposing
lawyers in the case. Furthermore, members of the defense bar could
point to anecdotal evidence of prosecutors mishandling witnesses.
Several such incidents are noted at the start of this Article.6' Thus, there
are compelling reasons to believe that some prosecutors as well as some
defense lawyers attempt to influence witnesses unfairly and to infect
other relevant evidence.
In fact, because prosecutors and the defense regularly meet with
witnesses without opposing counsel present,6' all lawyer-witness
communications potentially influence witness testimony in fundamental
ways that cannot be offset later when opposing counsel has a chance to
talk with, or to cross-examine, the witness in the presence of a judge or
jury. When lawyers meet with witnesses to prepare them to testify, they
may not document the witness's statements, let alone the advice they
give to the witness.63 Because so much is at stake in criminal cases, there
are convincing reasons to encourage transparency in the entire witness
preparation process. Although customary discovery practices in criminal
cases do not demand such transparency, the Criminal Justice Standards
for Prosecution and Defense Functions can create an influential check on
an advocate's intended or inadvertent tainting of witness testimony. The
Standards might outline a best-practices approach that permits both the
61. See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
62. Although practices differ by jurisdiction, many do not regularly use depositions, which are
customary in civil cases.
63. When I was a federal prosecutor, this topic was often debated. The general advice was to
avoid taking notes so that the prosecutor avoids creating evidence of a witness's inconsistent
statements. The Jencks Act generally requires production to the defense of witness "statements" in
the government's possession following a witness's testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006). For purposes of
the Jencks Act, a statement is one adopted by the witness, a substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement by the witness, or a witness's statement before the grand jury. See id. § 3500(e). Of course,
documented or not, inconsistent statements may constitute Brady information that should be
produced to the defense. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (withholding evidence of
witness credibility when it may be determinative of guilt may violate Brady); see also United States v.
Campos, No. 92-4573, 1994 l- 144866, at *13 (5th Cir. Apr. -4, 1994) (not selected for publication)
(indicating that prior inconsistent statements can violate Brady).
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prosecution and the defense to tell witnesses (I) that opposing counsel or
their agents will likely contact the witness; (2) that the witness should be
careful to ask which side-defense or prosecution-the lawyer or agent
represents; and (3) that while under no obligation to do so, a witness
should feel free to talk candidly and honestly with opposing counsel but
should also speak carefully, because everything said to either lawyer will
likely be documented either in writing or in a recording and may be
repeated later in court. The Standards could also recommend that both
the prosecution and the defense avoid any communication with a witness
that is likely to impact the substance of the witness's potential testimony.
The Standards could provide a very limited right for defense counsel to
protect important but vulnerable witnesses and a more expansive right
for the prosecution to protect witnesses from intimidation. In other
words, a separate Standard, beyond that contained in the Investigation
Standards, is warranted for both the prosecution and for the defense.
The Prosecution Function Standards should allow more protection for
victims than other witnesses; they should also allow prosecutors limited
discretion to protect any witness from intimidation or threats, and the
Standards for both the prosecution and the defense should be clearer and
more detailed.
B. COMMUNICATING WARNINGS TO WITNESSES
This subpart explores the need for prosecutors and criminal defense
lawyers to warn a noncustodial witness of her constitutional protection
from compelled self-incrimination and, relatedly, considers whether
these lawyers should provide other admonitions if a witness begins to
reveal privileged communications. Neither prosecutors nor defense
lawyers are legally obligated to inform noncustodial witnesses of Fifth
Amendment rights or evidentiary privileges. The question remains
whether the Standards should promote more protection for witnesses
than the law demands. Additionally, a witness may sometimes perceive a
prosecutor's warning about self-incrimination as a subtle threat instead
of a cautionary protection. This subpart considers the Standards'
regulation of those subtle threats too.
i. The Prosecution Function Standard
Proposed Standard 3-3.5(e) provides that prosecutors "should
advise a witness who is to be interviewed of his or her rights against self-
incrimination and the right to counsel whenever the law so requires."6 4
64. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUInON FUNCTION § 3-3.5(e) (Proposed Revisions
2010) (emphasis added). In full, proposed Standard 3-3.5(e) states:
A prosecutor should advise a witness who is to be interviewed of his or her rights
against self-incrimination and the right to counsel whenever the law so requires. A
prosecutor should also consider so advising a witness if the prosecutor reasonably believes
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Likewise, "[a] prosecutor should also consider so advising a witness if the
prosecutor reasonably believes the witness may provide self-incriminating
information and the witness appears not to know his or her rights.""
The proposed Standard provides no protection beyond what the law
already demands from prosecutors. Thus, it lacks an aspirational
component. Presumably, the "whenever the law so requires" language
refers to the Supreme Court's general pronouncement that a statement
may not be introduced in a prosecutor's case-in-chief if the statement is
obtained in violation of the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona,6 or in breach
of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compelled self-incrimination.6 7
But the language could hardly be more conceptual. If the drafters mean
that prosecutors should warn all persons subject to "custodial
interrogation," then that is what the proposed Standard should say. If the
proposed Standard is intended to be more restrictive or inclusive, then it
should say so expressly. Indeed, if the drafters believe that prosecutors
should err on the side of warning witnesses who may incriminate
themselves, telling prosecutors that they should also "consider" giving
such warnings is excessively permissive. If the Standard is meant to
require prosecutors to tell witnesses that they have no obligation to talk,
that their statements can be used against them in subsequent criminal
proceedings, and that they may consult counsel before talking, then the
Standard should say that directly.
Discussions in the roundtable sessions underscored a need for the
Standards to state their expectations expressly. In both Florida and Ohio,
prosecutors were adamantly opposed to a Standard that required them to
warn witnesses when the law does not require such warnings. In contrast,
in Rhode Island, prosecutors believed that such a Standard was
unnecessary because of common practice. In Rhode Island, it is
customary for prosecutors to advise all witnesses who appear before a
grand jury of their rights against self-incrimination. In the view of
prosecutors there, a Standard on the subject would be gratuitous and
superfluous. Nevertheless, even in Rhode Island, there are noncustodial
situations beyond the grand jury room in which prosecutors will
interview witnesses who are likely to incriminate themselves. Therefore,
the witness may provide self-incriminating information and the witness appears not to
know his or her rights. However, a prosecutor should not exaggerate the potential criminal
liability of a witness, or so advise a witness, with a purpose, or in a manner likely, to
intimidate or influence the truthfulness or completeness of the witness's testimony or to
unfairly alter the witness's decision whether to provide information.
Id.
65. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.5(e) (Proposed Revisions
200) (emphasis added).
66. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .").
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customary practice does not dictate how prosecutors there will handle
those witnesses and whether they should err on the side of providing a
warning, decide on a case-by-case basis, leave each decision to the
discretion of the individual prosecutor, or comply with the law without
more.
If we want witnesses across the country to receive consistent
treatment from prosecutors, then the proposed Standards should indicate
best practices regarding when prosecutors should warn witnesses. If the
prevailing view is that witnesses deserve no warnings beyond what the
law requires, then proposed Standard 3-3.5(e) should be deleted, because
it adds no value. Yet, its presence suggests that the Standards encourage
some behavior beyond the legal mandates. The Standards are neither
binding nor obligatory; thus, if this Standard merely restates the current
law, why bother having a Standard on this subject?
Accepting that some Standard should address this important and
recurring issue, it is necessary to determine the appropriate extent of
protection such a Standard should provide. The Standards could tell
prosecutors to advise all witnesses in the grand jury, all witnesses whom
prosecutors believe may incriminate themselves, or require such
warnings only if a witness asks about her rights. As noted, there is
disagreement across jurisdictions about how prosecutors should act. A
case can be made that prosecutors should remind all witnesses of their
rights against self-incrimination before interviewing them, especially
considering that prosecutors hold extensive power and may be perceived
by the typical witness as exceptionally intimidating. Also, bright-line
directions are easy to understand and to follow. Such a rule would help
to ensure that witnesses understand the gravity of their statements and
that they are speaking voluntarily, underscoring that they have no
obligation to talk if they prefer to remain silent. On the other hand, such
warnings may discourage some witnesses from sharing relevant
information that may increase accurate trial outcomes and prompt fair
plea agreements. Whatever the drafters decide, the current proposal
should be modified for clarity and force.
Even beyond self-incrimination warnings, a persuasive case can be
made that prosecutors, who are tasked with seeking justice, should
respect other important interests of a witness, such as evidentiary
privileges. Imagine that a prosecutor begins an interview with innocuous
questions, eliciting background information from a witness about a crime
and, in response, a witness begins to share privileged marital
communications or protected attorney-client communications. Should a
prosecutor interrupt the witness, discuss the privilege, and ensure that
the witness understands that by revealing the communications, she is
probably waiving the protection? Or should the witness answer at her
own risk? The law provides no protection for witnesses who ignorantly
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waive privileges, but prosecutors preying on witness ignorance smacks of
gamesmanship and power imbalance, not fair play. If prosecutors are
ministers of justice, then they arguably should deal with witnesses at a
level well above the legal mandates and behave in ways that create
respect and admiration for prosecutors' just treatment of all persons
touched by the criminal justice system, particularly witnesses and victims
who are usually unintended participants in the process. Despite good
reasons for prosecutors to protect witnesses from inadvertent waivers, in
all three roundtable meetings, discussants believed that witnesses should
bear the burden of asserting privileges and that the Standards should not
impose any obligation on the prosecutor to protect such communications.
Even if protection for privilege lacks support from a majority of
practitioners in the regions I visited, the Standards should, nevertheless,
protect these communications. A Standard that demands an exceedingly
high level of professionalism for witness interactions and that fosters the
rights of witnesses is an appropriate goal for aspirational standards such
as these. Standards, after all, are designed to provide guidance for
optimal, not merely ethical, lawyer behaviors.
In addition to providing only vague guidance on when to warn
witnesses of the right to counsel and the right against compelled self-
incrimination, proposed Standard 3-3.5(e) tells prosecutors that they
"should not exaggerate the potential criminal liability of a witness, or so
advise a witness, with a purpose, or in a manner likely, to intimidate or
influence the truthfulness or completeness of the witness's testimony or
to unfairly alter the witness's decision whether to provide information."6
This portion of proposed Standard 3-3.5(e) is certainly directed at
unsavory threats and intimidation that might change a witness's
testimony or even her willingness to talk or to testify. The need for such
a Standard is demonstrated by the Broadcom and Golding cases
referenced at the beginning of this Article.'o Although discouraging
intimidating communications directed at potential witnesses is
undoubtedly a laudable goal, this provision creates tension with another
provision within the same Standard that encourages prosecutors to
"consider" advising a witness if the prosecutor reasonably believes the
witness may provide self-incriminating information." A prosecutor can
use a self-incrimination warning in a good-faith effort to protect a
witness's interests, but also as a sword to suggest that the witness is
subject to criminal prosecution. The Standards should explain where the
68. See supra note 16.
69. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.5(e) (Proposed Revisions
2010).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13-




line falls between appropriate and inappropriate self-incrimination
warnings, or at least acknowledge that self-incrimination cautions
sometimes go too far and constitute threats.
In addition to creating some internal conflict, proposed Standard 3-
3.5(e) extends to warnings implicating potential criminal liability but
overlooks other types of similar "warnings."" The Standards should
extend to communications that use criminal or noncriminal adverse
consequences to deter witnesses' truthful testimony. The current
proposal permits a prosecutor to insinuate or say-presuming the
information is truthful-that by coming forward to testify for the
defense, the witness risks becoming visible to the Internal Revenue
Service for her questionable tax practices, or that admitting, in the course
of her testimony, to operating a child care business out of her home
could subject the witness's business to closure for violation of a local
ordinance." Seemingly, the spirit of the proposed Standard would reach
this "advice," but the wording of the proposal has restricted the
Standard's coverage to potential criminal liability. The Standards should
be broadened to cover both explicit and implicit threats designed to
influence any witness's testimony.
Whether or not proposed Standard 3-3.5(e) reaches (or should
reach) other intimidating "warnings," the language does not provide as
much meaningful advice to prosecutors as it should. It plainly tells
prosecutors not to try to change a witness's testimony, but adds the
tentative words, "in a manner likely, to intimidate or influence" the
witness." Is the prosecutor expected to predict the witness's sensitivity to
the prosecutor's influence, or is this an objective, "reasonable person"
standard? The Standards could effectively adopt a totality of the
circumstances, reasonable person in the witness's situation, test. But
whatever the test, the drafters should include it expressly. Furthermore,
the proposed Standard fails to explain what it means to "unfairly" alter a
witness's decision to provide information. Because the proposed
Standard is silent on these points, prosecutors, who are naturally
predisposed to believe that the defendant is guilty-and that witnesses
have important evidence of that guilt-will tend to press witnesses to
provide testimony favorable to the government's case. This sort of




75. See discussion supra intro. (discussing several cases in which witness testimony was seemingly
tainted by pretrial communications).
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2. The Defense Function Standard
Proposed Defense Function Standard 4 -4.4(d) tells the defense that
"[i]t is not necessary for defense counsel or defense counsel's
investigator ... to caution . .. witness[es] concerning possible self-
incrimination and the need for counsel.",6 Although proposed Standard
4-4.4(d) never requires a defense lawyer to advise a witness of her Fifth
Amendment rights, from the witness's viewpoint, an incriminating
statement may be detrimental regardless of whether it is elicited by the
prosecution or the defense. Furthermore, if the witness's potential
testimony is adverse to the defense, the defense may be motivated to try
to obtain harmful admissions and to pass them along to the prosecution.
Because our system often hinges on civilian witness participation, a
persuasive argument can be made for adopting a Standard that favors
such warnings for both prosecution and defense, at least when the
lawyers have reason to believe a witness is likely to incriminate herself.
Providing extensive protections for witnesses will tend to promote open
and honest witness participation. Of course, the Fifth Amendment
privilege and the protections of Miranda do not apply to nongovernmental
action, so there is no legal obligation on defense counsel to warn a
witness of possible incrimination.' However, the absence of a legal
obligation does not foreclose a different practice as a matter of ethics and
professionalism.
Despite my reservations about absolving the defense from concern
for a witness's self-incrimination, in all three jurisdictions I visited during
roundtable discussions, judges and practitioners agreed that defense
lawyers should bear no responsibility to warn witnesses about self-
incrimination and, thus, the proposed Standard is appropriate as written.
The participants were satisfied that witnesses were not prevented from
asserting their rights. Perhaps their position was not surprising, given that
most participants did not favor prosecutors providing warnings beyond
those the law demands. Nevertheless, the Standards should not reflect
the majority position or even the ethical floor. They should provide
guidance for those lawyers seeking to practice at the professional peak.
As the implementation of Miranda for custodial suspects has shown,
advising witnesses of their rights against self-incrimination is unlikely to
significantly impair fact gathering.,8 At the same time, advice regarding
Fifth Amendment rights would protect witnesses against inequitable
76. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCION § 4-4.4(d) (Proposed Revisions 2oo9).
77. See United States v. Sanchez, 614 F-3 d 876, 886 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the constraints of
the Fifth Amendment do not apply to purely private activity).
78. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v.
Arizona), 99 GEo. L.J. I, 27 (2010) (discussing various studies and theories on Miranda's impact on




treatment that often results from socioeconomic status, race, or cognitive
lawyer bias."
Related to a lawyer's duty to warn a witness of potential self-
incrimination are the ethical issues that arise when defense counsel
prefers that a witness invoke her Fifth Amendment right to silence in the
face of a prosecutor's request for an interview or in response to questions
posed during a hearing or trial. If defense counsel interviews a witness
and learns that the witness's testimony will implicate the witness as well
as the defendant, is defense counsel free to advise the witness to invoke
her Fifth Amendment privilege? In i99i, Bruce Green posed this
question in his article Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of
the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law and concluded that "the ethical
codes fail to speak clearly to the question."" Although the Model Rules
might be interpreted to prevent such "advice,""' the proposed Standards
do not speak to the topic. The Standards should remove this ambiguity
so that defense counsel is not left to guess about whether she is permitted
to urge invocation. The ambiguity in the Model Rules provides an
opportunity for the Standards to supply helpful clarification about when,
if ever, defense counsel can advise on invocation. For instance, the
Standards might clarify that defense counsel is prohibited from advising
nonclient witnesses to invoke the right.
Even if defense counsel bears no duty to advise a witness about her
right against self-incrimination, should defense counsel be encouraged to
respect other privileges held-maybe unknowingly-by a witness, such
as the attorney-client or the penitent-clergy privilege? Participants of the
roundtable discussions thought that witnesses should operate at their
own risk in asserting or waiving privileges, regardless of whether they
were interviewed by the prosecution or by the defense. But for the same
reasons that prosecutors should respect witnesses' rights and thereby
encourage witness participation in the criminal justice process, there are
system-integrity reasons to draft a standard for defense counsel that
urges them to honor witnesses' privileged communications. If lawyers are
to be trusted so that witnesses will feel comfortable talking unguardedly
with them, all lawyers must treat witnesses with respect. Arguably, such
respect would include acknowledging a witness's privileges and,
conversely, not capitalizing on a witness's ignorance of her legal rights.
79. See, e.g., Erica J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, ioi J. CluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 72-74 (201)
(highlighting data and the lack of data on why poor people are overrepresented in the criminal justice
system); Michael Mello, Ivon Stanley and James Adams' America: Vectors of Racism in Capital
Punishment, 43 Ciu. L. BULL. 636, 652 n.ioi (2oo7) (detailing some of the extensive literature on race
and capital punishment).
So. Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the
Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REv. 687,691, 698 (1i9).
S. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 4.3 (2010).
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Having considered the proposed Standards' stance on communications
about opposing counsel and warnings to witnesses, this Article now turns
to lawyers' communications with experts.
C. COMMUNICATING WITH EXPERT WITNESSES
As science and technology have advanced and become a prevalent
part of hearings and trials, the need for expert witnesses has swelled,
requiring prosecutors and the defense to meet with and prepare these
witnesses frequently.8' The more frequent the interactions, the greater
the need for guidance on the boundaries for such meetings and
communications. This subpart looks first at the proposed Standards for
prosecutors before addressing the similar proposed Standard for the
defense.
i. The Prosecution Function Standard
Proposed Standard 3-3.6 addresses a prosecutor's "relationship"
with expert witnesses and greatly expands, both in length and coverage,
the reach of current Standard 3-3.3, entitled "Relations with Expert
Witnesses." The current Standard speaks to two broad topics: (1) the
need for prosecutors to respect the independence of experts, and (2) the
impropriety of paying experts an "excessive" fee.83 In contrast to the brief
and targeted current Standard, the proposed Standard is highly detailed,
lengthy, and urges due diligence in multiple aspects of the prosecutor's
communications. For example, the proposed Standard tells the
prosecutor that she "should investigate the expert's credentials, relevant
professional experience, and reputation in the field," as well as
determine whether the witness's " articular theory, method, or
conclusions" are scientifically accepted. The proposed Standard further
82. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 669 n.123
(1992) (noting that the number of expert witnesses in one county of Illinois increased 1540%, from 188
to 31oo, between 1974 and 1989); Renee A. Forinash, Analyzing Scientific Evidence: From Validity to
Reliability with a Two-Step Approach, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 223, 251 (1992) (noting the importance of
expert witness testimony in complex technical litigation).
83. Current Standard 3-3.3 says:
(a) A prosecutor who engages an expert for an opinion should respect the independence
of the expert and should not seek to dictate the formation of the expert's opinion on the
subject. To the extent necessary, the prosecutor should explain to the expert his or her role
in the trial as an impartial expert called to aid the fact finders and the manner in which the
examination of witnesses is conducted.
(b) A prosecutor should not pay an excessive fee for the purpose of influencing the
expert's testimony or to fix the amount of the fee contingent upon the testimony the expert
will give or the result in the case.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.3 (3d ed. 1993).




instructs that a prosecutor "should examine [the] testifying expert's
background and credentials" and should study the substantive area of the
witness's expertise "to enable effective preparation of the expert, as well
as cross-examination of any defense expert on the relevant topic." 8
Arguably, this level of detail is unnecessary for trial preparation issues in
an adversarial system in which each side maintains robust incentives to
find and present the most qualified and convincing experts." In a
competitive system, these are topics a prosecutor would typically
investigate and consider before selecting an expert, but any weakness in
an expert's background, preparation, or methods would usually be
exposed by defense counsel during cross-examination. Moreover, by
covering so many topics in the Standard, the drafters have reduced the
emphasis on the most important aspect: ensuring the dispassionate
objectivity of the "expert" witness.
While extensive verbiage in proposed Standard 3-3.6 is devoted to
prosecutors' methods in selecting and preparing experts for trial, the
proposal spends few words on maintaining the independence of these
witnesses. Most directly, proposed Standard 3-3.6(d) tells the prosecitor
that she "should explain to the expert that the expert's role in the
proceeding will be as an impartial witness called to aid the fact-finders,"8 7
but this guidance is sandwiched among other advice about examining the
expert's background and credentials, and is included with instructions on
other trial strategy topics. Paragraphs (f) and (g) within proposed
Standard 3-3.6 also speak to objectivity. Paragraph (f) says: "The
prosecutor should provide the expert with all information reasonably
necessary to support a full and fair opinion."" Paragraph (g) adds: "The
prosecutor should timely disclose to the defense all evidence or
information learned from an expert that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigate the offense, even if the prosecutor does not intend to
call the expert as a witness." 8
Does the language "provide the expert with all information
reasonably necessary to support a full and fair opinion"" require the
disclosure of all adverse information or only adverse information that the
prosecutor deems "material?" It is not unusual for the prosecution to
present an expert witness with a series of facts expressing only the
victims' version of events without mentioning the defendant's conflicting
85. Id. § 3-3.6(d).
86. The proposed Standard parallels in many respects the "Daubert standard," which federal trial
judges apply when deciding whether to permit expert scientific testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
87. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUrION FUNCriON § 3-3.6(d) (Proposed Revisions
2010).
88. Id. § 3-3.6(f).
89. Id. § 3-3.6(g).
90. Id. § 3-3.6(f).
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story. Especially in cases with competing evidence that hinge on witness
credibility, should prosecutors be permitted to ask an expert to assume
the truth only of statements made by the victim and other prosecution
witnesses, thus presenting a one-sided fact scenario? Unfortunately, the
proposed Standard is unclear about whether this practice would
constitute an ethical violation. The proposed Standard should, therefore,
be modified so that prosecutors know whether they are required to share
with an expert evidence that conflicts with the prosecutor's theory of the
case.
Paragraph (g) talks in terms of tendencies to negate guilt or to
mitigate the offense." Perhaps the language is designed to mirror the
Supreme Court's definition of "Brady material," as famously announced
in Brady v. Maryland." However, the proposed Standard does not use
the word "Brady" and, therefore, may require more or demand less than
the Brady decision. In a prior draft, paragraph (g) said that prosecutors
should disclose information from other experts "that [is] materially
adverse to the prosecution's case."' Even in that version, the word
"material" was undefined, leaving doubt about whether the drafters
intended material to have the meaning assigned by the Supreme Court in
Kyles v. Whitley,' or some other meaning. Should paragraph (g) contain
a materiality requirement? The law does not require prosecutors to
produce evidence merely because it has exculpatory value." Such
evidence must also create some reasonable chance of impacting the
outcome of the case. The Standard, which is aspirational by design, can
and should reach beyond what the law requires. Especially in this
particularly troubling area-involving Brady obligations' and potential
violations that are sometimes uncovered fortuitously and often only
years after a wrongful conviction8-in which prosecutors are often loath
to produce too much information and, not uncommonly, err on the side
of producing too little, the Standard should urge prosecutors to be more
generous in producing documents and other evidence. Furthermore,
91. Id. § 3-3.6(g).
92. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused ... violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. . . .").
93. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.3(g) (Proposed Revisions
2009).
94. 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995) (finding evidence is material when it has "a reasonable
probability" of changing the outcome of a trial).
95. Id. at 436-37.
96. Id. at 435.
97. For a discussion of the changes to the Standards for Brady disclosure obligations, see Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGs L.J. 1321 (2011).




whatever their substantive requirements, the Standards should be
apparent in their goals.
Even if proposed Standard 3-3.6 imposes a materiality requirement,
it appears to permit crafty lawyering to avoid the creation of exculpatory
information from an expert. As proposed, the Standard allows a
prosecutor to tell a potential expert that the expert should review the file
and determine whether she is able to opine X, but that if the expert finds
that she is unable to offer opinion X, no further work need be done on
the file, and no opinions need be articulated or shared. In this way, the
prosecutor avoids the creation of any adverse opinions. If the proposed
Standard is intended to deter this practice, its wording should be
modified to make its objective unmistakable.
In any event, the proposed Standard should be edited to ensure an
emphasis on maintaining objective experts who offer logical and rational
opinions and to avoid covering so many minor details that the main
thrust of the Standard becomes obscured.
2. The Defense Function Standard
Should defense counsel share the same obligations as prosecutors to
ensure the independence and unbiased nature of an expert witness?
Proposed Defense Function Standard 4-4.5 would seem to suggest yes, at
least in large part." As with the new proposal for prosecutors, proposed
Standard 4-4.5 seeks to dictate how defense counsel interacts with
experts at a micro level. To a large degree, it includes specifics
comparable to those in the proposal for prosecutors, including a
provision telling defense counsel that she "should respect the
independence of the expert" and that she should explain to the expert
that her role is "to aid the fact finders and not act as a partisan."" As
with the proposal for prosecutors, proposed Standard 4-4.5 also spends
many paragraphs addressing due diligence and trial preparation issues."o
On one hand, explicit guidance about the approach defense counsel
should employ in evaluating and selecting experts may promote the
effective assistance of counsel, urging all defense lawyers, especially
novices, to exercise attention to every detail in selecting and preparing
these influential witnesses. On the other hand, not every case demands
the same degree of attention to experts. Assuming competent counsel,
99. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTIcE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.5 (Proposed Revisions 2009).
oo. Id. § 4-4.5(c).
To. See, e.g., id. § 4-4.5(b) ("Before engaging an expert, defense counsel should investigate the
expert's credentials, relevant professional experience, and reputation in the field."); id. § 4-4.5(c)
("Defense counsel should explain ... the manner in which the examination of the expert witnesses is
likely to be conducted, and suggest likely impeachment questions the expert may be asked."); id. § 4-
4.5(f) ("Defense counsel should . .. seek to learn enough about the substantive area of the expert's
expertise to enable effective preparation of the defense expert, as well as cross-examination of the
government's expert.").
I1256 [Vol. 62:I 1227J
QUIETING COGNITIVE BIAS
Standards that demand this level of concentration on expert witnesses
may result in less attention to other equally (or more) important aspects
of a given case. Perhaps the proposed Standards are too detailed,
covering too many specifics and not enough major themes, such as
impartiality and lawyer diligence. Nevertheless, a highly detailed
Standard is more suited to the defense than to the prosecution. When
defense counsel complies with a highly detailed Standard, clients and
courts may be more readily satisfied that counsel has fulfilled her role to
represent her client diligently.
Although the proposed Standard addressing experts has become too
detailed in some ways, its emphasis on clarity is laudable, as clarity
reduces the likelihood of judgment-clouding cognitive biases.
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors and defense counsel constantly interact with potential
witnesses, including sensitive victims and savvy experts. This Article asks
some questions and offers a few thoughts about the type and amount of
guidance the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecution and
Defense Functions should provide lawyers who communicate with these
and other putative witnesses. It ultimately argues for clarity because
plain standards will lessen unnecessary discretion and reduce the impact
of individual lawyers' cognitive bias to which we are all vulnerable.
Reducing ambiguity about the types of communications lawyers may and
may not undertake with witnesses should result in more equitable
treatment of witnesses and, thus, lead to a criminal justice system more
worthy of confidence.
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